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MS. HESSE:

I want to thank everyone for

joining us this morning for the virtual 47th Annual
Conference on International Law and Policy.
We are doing the panel on “Tech, Platform,
and Privacy — What the Future Holds,” a very minor set
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of issues to tackle in the next hour and twenty
minutes.

Nothing big is going on in any of these

areas, so I think this is going to be a very dull,
boring discussion amongst this panel.

We will be

covering privacy and competition law and policy with a
mix of U.S. and European government and private sector
perspectives.
We have a terrific lineup this morning who I
am going to introduce, and then we will jump right in.
We will be holding some time at the end for
questions from the audience, so please send those in
using the Q&A function.

James will be moderating the

questions and passing them to me.

Forgive us if we do

not get to everything that comes in, but please do
send your questions along and we will try to get them
either as we move through the session or at the end.
Please send them when they come up and we will see if
we can address them.
There is a CLE code for this session.
CLE code is TPP20.

The
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Let me introduce our panelists.
Cani Fernández is the President of the
National Commission for Markets and Competition in
Spain.

She has had a very distinguished career —
[audio cuts out repeatedly over the next

couple of minutes]
... of the antitrust department of Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, and Vice Chair of
the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust
Law.
Next is Sean Royall, a Partner at Kirkland &
Ellis’s Dallas and Washington, D.C. offices and
focuses on antitrust and consumer protection from both
the litigation and government investigations
perspectives.

Mr. Royall previously served as the

Deputy Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition,
and in that capacity he supervised the FTC’s
investigations of many major mergers and acquisitions,
and also served as lead trial counsel in a landmark
patent-related monopolization suit that the FTC
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brought against computer chip designer Rambus.
Last but definitely not least is Koren WongErvin, a Partner at Axinn, Veltrop, and Harkrider.
She has also worked in-house, in academia, and in
government, and previously served as an attorney
adviser to FTC Commissioner Wright and counsel for IP
and International Antitrust at the FTC.
With those introductions, we are going to
get started.
Sean is going to lead off.

The first topic

we are going to cover is the general question of where
do privacy and competition come together.
MR. ROYALL:

Thanks, Renata.

I am going to kick us off by laying out some
of the theories that have been proposed for how
privacy-related concerns can — or in some cases
arguably should — be taken into account in antitrustand competition-related analyses, and then Koren is
going to share some additional thoughts on each point,
and maybe other panelists as well.
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The first concept is that privacy — or, more
specifically, protections on user or consumer privacy
— can be viewed as a feature of competition.

The

notion is that just as firms compete across a range of
other quality-based dimensions, they also compete, or
may compete, to win and retain users or consumers by
offering to enforce more user-friendly privacy
protections.
With that as a starting premise, the theory
is that in the absence of robust competition, dominant
firms may lack incentives to improve their privacy and
data collection practices in a way that would best
serve consumer interests, and may even regress by
failing to enforce their existing privacy policies,
the idea being that erosion of privacy protections and
diminished incentives to continue competing to improve
such protections may be akin to an increase in
quality-adjusted prices.
Various people have discussed this idea, but
it was featured, for example, in a 2019 article by

6

Dina Srinivasan entitled “The Antitrust Case Against
Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards Pervasive
Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for
Privacy,” where she asserted that in the earlier years
of social media platforms the platforms were competing
furiously in an attempt to win market share in part
through the quality of their privacy protection.
Applying this concept, let’s say for example
in a merger context, theoretically a merger that led
to increased concentration in a market where firms
depend heavily on the collection and accumulation of
consumer data could potentially be seen as
anticompetitive, in part because of an anticipated
lessening in incentives to protect consumer privacy.
I will note, though, that this theory seems to rest
not only on the premise that firms at times compete on
privacy, but also to some extent on some built-in
assumptions.
One of those is an underlying assumption
that consumers do in fact, and maybe even universally,
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take privacy into account when they choose among
alternative products and services.
Another assumption seems to be that
consumers as a group think about and value privacy and
data collection practices in a sufficiently uniform
way that one can observe which approaches to these
issues may be “better” or more consumer-friendly than
others.
In a speech earlier this year given by FTC
Commissioner Noah Phillips at Stanford Law School, he
touched on these issues.

He expressed fairly deep

skepticism about antitrust theories that presume some
form of consensus in terms of how consumers approach
privacy-related issues and what tradeoffs they are
willing to make in choosing among products and
services.
He noted that while we all want lower
prices, there are examples of consumers exhibiting
fundamentally divergent views about privacy.

He

suggested that even if there is something to this
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“privacy as quality” concept, you need to be very
careful where the value or aspect of competition that
you are focused on is one that potentially lends
itself to polar disagreements among the very consumers
whose interests you are seeking to protect.
The last thing I would mention is that
quality as a form of competition is not an entirely
novel concept for antitrust.

It is also not something

that comes up very often, at least as a central
concern for antitrust enforcement in the merger
context or otherwise.

While there are examples of

mergers being challenged because of effects in
innovation markets, usually when these issues arise
there is some very concrete and identifiable risk to
consumers.
With that introduction of the issue, Koren,
what are your thoughts on this?
MS. WONG-ERVIN:

Thank you, and thank you to

the organizers for inviting me and to Renata for
organizing this panel.
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I think that the privacy-as-quality analogy
on its face is appealing, but when you take a closer
look, I think the analogy falls apart, and this is for
at least four reasons.

There is a really excellent

paper by Professor James Cooper that goes over some of
these, and I recommend you read this paper.1
The first reason is that, unlike a
manufacturer who is exercising monopoly power to skimp
on quality in order to make more money, when you have,
say, an online publisher who decides to collect and
mine additional data, there is no automatic benefit to
that publisher from reducing privacy.

In fact, when

you collect and store and analyze data, that is an
additional cost.
So I think it is more appropriate to look at
the publisher’s collection and use of data as an
investment.

The publisher hopes that it can use this

data to enhance revenue through providing consumers

1

James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, The First Amendment, and
Subjectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147 (2013).
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with higher-quality content and selling more finely
targeted ads.

So, to me reductions in privacy would

be an odd way to exercise monopoly power.
The second thing is that unlike, let’s say,
a lower-quality car, consumers derive some benefits
from the data they reveal, and those benefits must be
weighed against any privacy reductions.

Of course,

these benefits can include increased or better
services or products and revenue streams that allow
platforms to offer things like zero-monetary-price
goods and services.
The third thing is what Sean mentioned,
which is that the value that consumers place on these
costs and benefits varies greatly throughout the
population, which would make identifying a lessening
of competition difficult to say the least.

I think

when you take into consideration the varying privacy
tastes of consumers, a firm’s decision to collect more
or less data should be seen as product differentiation
and not as an exercise of monopoly power.
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The fourth reason is what is known as the
“privacy paradox,” or the difference between stated
and revealed preferences — for example, the difference
between what consumers say on surveys and how they
behave in the real world.

Now, this is not to say

that privacy is not important or that consumers do not
have an increased expectation of privacy, but rather
to say that it is complicated and that we should be
very wary of government enforcers imposing their own
privacy tastes on consumers.
The last thing I will say is that in the
unilateral conduct context it is particularly
difficult for me to envision the privacy-as-quality
theory because you need some type of exclusionary
conduct that results in harm to competition.

If you

have poor privacy alone, that is not sufficient.

At

least in the United States, firms are free to charge
the highest price that the market will bear.
Now there is one type of conduct that I have
heard, and I will turn it back over to Sean to discuss
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that.
MR. ROYALL:

Focusing on unilateral conduct,

it has been suggested that a second way that privacyrelated concerns may warrant antitrust enforcement is
in instances in which a firm arguably has made
misrepresentations about privacy in order to secure a
dominant market position.
In the same article that I mentioned
earlier, Dina Srinivasan asserts that Facebook engaged
in what she claims was a “decade-long pattern of false
statements and misleading conduct” involving claims of
superior representations of protecting consumer
privacy, all with the aim of inducing consumers to
trust and favor Facebook over all targets.

She

asserts that Facebook’s robust privacy-related
assurances in that time period foreclosed competition
in what was at that time a contested market, but that
the company then later consciously reneged on its
commitments in a way that she claims is evidence that
the company now possesses monopoly power.
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Renata mentioned that while I was at the FTC
I was involved in the FTC’s Rambus case, and this
theory does remind me a bit of Rambus.

The argument

there was that Rambus exploited an industry standardsetting process by making false assurances to other
participants that it lacked patent rights over
proposed designs for computer memory chips that were
being standardized, and once the industry was
irreversibly locked into using the standardized design
that they adopted, Rambus then surfaced its patents
and began demanding royalties.
Koren, Rambus and I think some other cases
do at least provide some precedent for using the
antitrust law to challenge alleged deceptive conduct
that gives rise to monopoly power, but what do you
think about applying these concepts of alleged
misrepresentations about privacy?
MS. WONG-ERVIN:

I will be very brief in

case Barry or Cani want to jump in.
I think that at the very least you would
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need a deception that is material in that it shifts
demand, and durable in that it is not easily
discovered or corrected, or that even once discovered
consumers cannot switch.

Under Rambus, of course, we

know there is the but-for standard, so a plaintiff
would need to prove that but for the misrepresentation
consumers would have chosen a different technology.
I do think there is one wrinkle to applying
Rambus – I am not saying that I don’t like the but-for
standard because I do — and that is that unlike in
Rambus, where you had a technology that was set
through standardization and there is arguably lock-in,
that is not the case in, say, Facebook or Google or
other platforms where consumers can and do switch.
MS. HESSE:

Let me jump in for a second with

a couple of follow-up questions.

There are two that I

want to hand out to people, whoever wants to jump in
and answer.
One is: Do we think that competition would
lead to greater transparency amongst firms in their
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privacy policies and how they protect privacy, and is
that a value that is something that competition law
should care about?
The other question goes to Sean, and he can
maybe answer that first and then we can go on, but
others might have views on this too.
the Rambus case.

You mentioned

I am wondering whether you have

views based on that experience and whether others have
views on how difficult it might be to bring an
antitrust case against a social media platform, for
example, for allegedly reneging on privacy policy
assurances; and, if you think that would be difficult,
why?
I will throw those out to the group and let
you all take it away.
MR. ROYALL:
second question.

I can comment briefly on the

Barry actually was at the FTC and we

were both in the deputy positions overlapping during
the Rambus years, and Barry may have been more
involved in the Commission appeal because I left right
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after the administrative trial.
We agonized in developing that case at the
FTC over proof issues and elements of proving
monopolization or attempted monopolization in this
context.

A couple of things that we agonized over and

spent a lot of time on are exactly things that Koren
alluded to.
One of them is: Was there true lock-in?
Because the whole theory was what economists refer to
as “hold-up,” that you needed a lock-in in order for
the parties that were allegedly harmed by this to have
been vulnerable to monopolistic practices.
In that case, there was a standard that was
adopted and there were literally billions of dollars
of capital investment around building memory chips
according to the standard that had been adopted, and
those investments occurred and they were sunk
irreversible costs before arguably — there was
disputed evidence — before anyone knew that Rambus had
or asserted patent rights.

So we thought there was
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rather strong evidence of lock-in.
I do not know here how you would prove lockin.

I think we are going to talk a little bit more

later about the concept of multihoming and the fact
that in social media people use different social media
platforms; people are not necessarily locked into one.
There is also potential to move, to port data from one
to another.

I just don’t know that the lock-in

concept really works or applies here.
The other thing that Koren alluded to is
but-for causation.

This actually ended up being a

weakness in the Rambus case that caused the D.C.
Circuit ultimately to reverse.
Speaking for the trial team in that case, we
were very focused on proving but-for causation and
proving that for each element of the standard that was
at issue there was an alternative technology, and the
proof, including contemporaneous documents and
testimony, showed that had the participants known
about Rambus’s patents, they had available alternative
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technologies and they would have adopted them and
avoided any patent exposure.

In the end, the D.C.

Circuit found that the proof was not convincing on
that point.
I do not know how you would prove but-for
causation here — that is, that but for these
representations about privacy that consumers would not
have adopted the Facebook platform.

Koren referred to

this idea of the difference between maybe what people
say in surveys and what their revealed preferences
are.

I do not know how you would use a survey group

or some other group to persuasively show that it was
the privacy-related representations that people were
relying on that caused them to adopt the platform.
MR. NIGRO:

I am happy to comment on that

briefly.
If a firm makes a representation or a
promise to keep certain information private and then
breaks that promise, it seems to me there is obviously
a breach of contract claim.

I agree with Sean that it
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is not so obvious how that would automatically convert
into an antitrust claim.
I think one of the challenges with privacy
is that it is not entirely clear how much people care
about it.

I think people know when they sign on to

these platforms or do business with a particular firm
that they are giving up a certain amount of
information or privacy in exchange for whatever
product or service they are looking to acquire.
I think if people really cared about privacy
and that affected their demand, that firms would
respond to that and it would be a significant
qualitative basis for competition among the firms.

It

would show up in the documents; it would be something
that they might advertise against each other on, etc.
It is just not clear to me how concerned people are
about privacy.
I do think it is important to distinguish
between privacy as some qualitative basis on which
firms compete and privacy as something that is valued
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as a matter of social policy.
In the case of the latter, I don’t know that
antitrust is the right tool to address it.

I think

that is better addressed through the legislative
process and the Executive Branch.

It does not neatly

fit into the antitrust world and I think efforts to
try to put it there when it belongs better elsewhere
are misguided.

I am hesitant to try to use antitrust

to address all concerns that people have with privacy.
MS. HESSE:

Cani, do you might something to

say?
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:

Thank you very much, Renata.

Listening to you and the whole debate on
whether consumers value privacy or not reminds me of
the movie Monty Python’s Life of Brian, when there is
this queue of people going to the crucifixion, and the
Romans ask them, “Crucifixion?” and they say, “Yes,
please.”
This is the view I have when you have to
tick to the privacy concern that you have to give in
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platforms.

It is either you say “yes” or you are

banned for life — you cannot use Facebook; you cannot
use Google; you cannot use anything that everybody is
using — and trying to survive with that goal, as I
have been trying to for some months, it is very
interesting the limitations that you are facing in
order to compete in searching with others.
I think that in the privacy debate privacy
has come at the moment in which we as consumers
probably have to surrender our privacy rights in order
to be able to use the service.

There is not

sufficient competition in these services, so I do not
think it is a really good choice or a choice in
competition terms.

That is my personal view.

I

wanted to be a little controversial in that.
There is a long debate on how consumers
value privacy, and I think there is a new set of
studies that puts the emphasis on the questions that
are to be made to consumers in order to ascertain
whether they value privacy or not.
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As to the debates on the relationship
between privacy and competition, I think this is a
very complex and manifold debate.

The goal is to find

the right balance, in my view, between competition and
user-protection objectives.
In some cases, regulation aiming at
protecting consumers may have unintended consequences
in competition, even adverse effects.

Sometimes

getting consumer consent — for example, with the new
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe —
may be very cumbersome.

And those that are already in

the market, the Big Tech companies, the incumbents,
those that were already dominant companies when the
GDPR was adopted, are not facing that constraint
because we already consented.

Even now, if we consent

once, we consent for the whole group of different
services or vertical searches that they are having.
So for new entrants it is not irrelevant how to
compete with this tick on privacy that sometimes is
very cumbersome.
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There are several theoretical and empirical
studies that are showing us that Big Tech, or even
incumbent companies that are already in those markets,
may be using the privacy regulation strategically in
order to set up barriers to entry — for example, in
data-sharing situations where others that could be new
entrants and enjoy the possibility of those synergies
in those data-sharing situations are barred from doing
so on the basis of regulation that is there in order
to protect consumers.

This is an unintended

consequence.
We have experiences of regulation that has
gone in the contrary sense, that has proved to be
procompetitive.

One example of this is the Payment

Services Directive, which has played an important role
in establishing a framework within which financial
information from consumers must flow under secure
conditions so that fin-tech companies, for example,
are able to enter the market offering services that
are in a way increasing competition in those markets.
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So I would say that we should follow a caseby-case approach.

I am not sure that we have already

exhausted all the debates on whether privacy is good
or bad for competition and whether it is a parameter
of consumer welfare.

I think there are many things to

say there.
It is true that even when talking about
privacy we should be able to at least guarantee
interoperability and data portability and multihoming
because this is going to reduce switching costs.
Given the high concentration in the market and the
lock-in effects and the tipping dynamics that we are
experiencing, that could be reduced.
That is my first intervention in this panel.
Thank you.
MS. HESSE:

Thanks, Cani.

Much as I would like to keep talking about
this, because it is super-interesting, I think we need
to shift to our second topic, which is the topic of
the hour, and then maybe if we have a little bit more
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time, we can come back to this, because I think there
are lots of interesting questions about regulation as
a barrier to entry or creating barriers to entry for
smaller firms and questions about how the GDPR and the
California legislation have worked and what we can
learn about that as we go forward, particularly in the
United States, where we do not have any federal
privacy regulation yet.
But let’s jump into the Big Tech topic area.
Barry and Cani are going to lead us out on this one.
Here we are going to talk a bit about competition
enforcement versus regulation and whether these tools
are likely to be an effective way to address the
concerns and the issues that have been raised and that
we have been hearing about —

I do not mean to comment

one way or the other on whether those are valid or
invalid — but the things that we have been hearing
being expressed about what we like to call Big Tech.
Barry, do you want to start us off?
MR. NIGRO:

Sure.

Thank you, Renata.
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“Big Tech” is like “Big Data.”

It seems

like when people use that term they are suggesting a
conclusion, which is that there must be a problem
because it has the modifier “big” in front of it.

I

think in order to evaluate competition issues —
whether it is Big Tech, Big Data, or anything in that
realm — it is important to recognize that the concerns
and the issues can vary quite significantly.

So

precision is important when you talk about concerns
with Big Tech.
I don’t think it is fair to lump them all
together and treat them as though they all benefit and
suffer from the same sorts of issues, especially when
you are trying to decide whether the appropriate tool
for addressing those concerns is regulation or
competition.
Our general preference in the United States
is for competition over regulation.

I think this has

been a well-recognized principle going back hundreds
of years.

If you look at the Supreme Court’s Northern
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Pacific Railroad case, it talks about the Sherman Act
resting on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces yields the best
allocation of resources, the lowest price, and the
highest quality.
The Supreme Court’s decision in 1951 in
Standard Oil acknowledged the long-held faith in the
value of competition.

Much of the work of the

Antitrust Division has been aimed at furthering that
value and protecting it and ensuring that our markets
remain competitive.
That is not to say that there are not some
circumstances when regulation may be appropriate.

If

you think about markets that have characteristics of a
natural monopoly, where the economies of scale and the
savings from those economies are so pronounced, it may
be that the most efficient outcome is to have a single
firm — a monopolist so to speak.

It could be in that

case that, because of natural monopoly
characteristics, it is feasible to implement some sort
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of regulation in a way that improves market
performance, as compared to the economic performance
that would otherwise be associated with unregulated
markets; it may be that some sort of limited
regulation is appropriate.
I also think that even where you have a
dominant firm for some period, that is not necessarily
a bad thing.

If you think about what the Court said

in Trinko, charging monopoly prices by itself is not
only not unlawful but it is the opportunity to do so
that, at least for a short period, is what attracts
business acumen, and that induces risk-taking and
ideally in the long run produces greater output and
innovation.
It has generally been the view of the
antitrust agencies that big is not bad but big
behaving badly is bad.

I think that is a common

refrain.
I also think it is important to take account
of some of the learning that we have done in this
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area.
Commissioner Wilson recently spoke about the
benefits of deregulation.

In particular, she focused

on the bipartisan decision to disband the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board in
deregulating the railroad and airline industries and
the benefits of lower prices, higher output, and more
innovation that resulted from those efforts.
I think it is important to recognize that
regulation does have a cost associated with it — it is
not cost-free; it is a tradeoff — and that tradeoff
should be reserved for situations where the market
characteristics are such that antitrust is not up to
the task.

Let me just talk a minute about antitrust

and whether it is up to the task.
I will start by saying that digital services
are not necessarily inherently bad.

I think a lot of

them are where they are today in their popularity
because they provide something that is highly valued
by the consumer and platforms are not necessarily
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acting badly by charging high prices as a result of
their innovation.
But where they engage in unlawful conduct,
or conduct designed to maintain their monopoly or
otherwise distort competition, I think that is where
antitrust needs to step in and protect the market and
ensure that competition can thrive, that new
competitors are able to get in and provide an
alternative to consumers.

That is where the job of

the antitrust enforcers is at a premium.
While some may believe that it is possible
that regulation may be appropriate if carefully
tailored to address specific concerns that are not
appropriate for antitrust — because, for example, they
are better characterized as social policy concerns
rather than competition concerns, or because
circumstances are such that antitrust is incapable of
promoting long-run consumer welfare, such as the
natural monopoly example — I for one am not ready to
throw in the towel on antitrust.
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I do not think we are in a place where
antitrust has tried and failed.

I think part of the

problem and one of the concerns that people have is
that it has been more than a decade over which these
concerns have been expressed and we have not really
taken on some of these issues.
The transactions that are identified in the
House report and some of the conduct concerns have
essentially, at least so far, gone unchallenged.
have they gone unchallenged?

Why

Is it because the

concerns are not well founded, or is it because the
agencies lack adequate resources, or maybe it is
because there is too much concern with bringing a case
that might not be won?
I am more optimistic about antitrust than
some.

I said at the George Mason conference earlier

in the year, before Covid-19 hit, that the antitrust
agencies need to get out of their comfort zone and
bring the right cases, even if they may be hard to
win.

I do not know that that has happened yet with
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the current concerns that have been expressed.
When it has happened in the past, the
agencies have actually done quite well.

I am thinking

in particular of the conspiracy case against Apple
that was won and the case against Microsoft.

So when

we have gone to bat and used the antitrust tools in a
way that is appropriately aggressive, I think the
agencies have done well.
What we probably need is to invest more
energy in bringing the right sorts of cases and not
shying away from the possibility that they might be
lost.

I think that is what is needed, and until that

happens I am not ready to give up on antitrust and
jump right to regulation.
MS. HESSE:

I think people are eagerly

awaiting some cases that appear to be percolating, so
we will see.

Maybe we will see that play out.

MR. NIGRO:
talking about.

I have no idea what you are

[Laughter]

MS. HESSE:

I did want to turn to Cani and
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get your perspective on these issues because Europe
has been very, very active in this area.
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:
are right.

Thank you, Renata.

Yes, you

Big Tech’s impact on competition is one of

the most relevant challenges for policymakers and
enforcers.

We are concerned about increasing

concentration and reduced contestability in markets
dominated by digital behemoths.
As a consequence of this, the European Union
is considering as you know a New Competition Tool with
some ex ante investigative powers on the ability to
impose remedies, not necessarily applied in digital
markets exclusively but mainly.

The European Union is

also contemplating a potential Digital Services Act
with a specific regulation for digital so-called
“gatekeepers.”
We at the Spanish Competition Authority have
had the opportunity to state our position in our
contributions to the consultation opened by the
European Commission on these two instruments.

This
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input builds on the idea that we believe strongly that
intervention should not be taken for granted.
A test is, in our view, needed to determine
when intervention in a market is really necessary to
protect effective competition, innovation, and growth,
and thus regulation as well.
From our point of view, the debate should
focus first on identifying the gaps of the current
framework and the ways to solve those gaps and, in
view of the results of this analysis, then we should
go to the institutional setting — so who will be in
charge of applying potential new instruments or the
potential need for any regulator if that is the case?
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the
consistent implementation of the rules for digital
players shall apply in Europe strong harmonization
mechanisms across the European Union, and clear rules
as well for allocating competencies between the
Commission and the Member States.

At the moment, as

you know, there are several cases — for example, the
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booking hotels cases or others not really in very good
shape.
In addition, we believe that the current
toolkit, which includes both antitrust policies
forbidding concerted practices or abuse of dominant
position, and a specific sector regulation — for
example, energy, transport, but mainly telecoms and
audiovisuals — will remain, in our view, the main
instruments to address also competition problems.

It

is a combination of both of them.
We believe that there could be a risk of
undermining the efficacy of the new framework by
introducing new tools that are not yet completely
checked out.

This is why we have suggested a clear

hierarchy of instruments.

In our view, new policy

instruments should be enacted only where current tools
are not sufficient to tackle competition issues.
I can think, for example, of two possible
gaps under the current competition framework, at least
at the European level.
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First is attempted monopolization of a
sector, which you do cover with your framework but we
don’t because it would not fall under the category of
an abuse if the company is not yet dominant.

We have

Continental Can as a precedent, but Continental Can
was already a dominant company, so we did not have the
attempt to monopolize.

By eliminating future

competitors we see that there is a need for
enforcement and we do not have a very clear tool to do
so.
The second gap that I can identify easily is
the risk of tacit collusion, which cannot be addressed
in Europe under the traditional instruments against
cartels.

This behavior can be even further

facilitated by algorithmic techniques.
These are two gaps that probably need some
reflection on how to cope with them, and that is what
we have advocated, that we need horizontal — I mean in
general, across sectors, not only digital — and
flexible tools while keeping predictability and legal
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certainty, which is what businesses need in order to
operate in a market.
This horizontal dimension across the sectors
is necessary given that competition problems arise
everywhere nowadays, and in the near future we will
have rapidly evolving economies that are not only
digital but across other sectors.
Furthermore, even if one wants to put an
emphasis on digital markets, the truth is that all
sectors are becoming now affected by digitalization,
so we should not lose perspective there.
Remedies and interventions where needed must
be imposed only to those undertakings actually or
potentially distorting competition.
Our view is that we should follow a case-bycase approach, even if regulation should be enforced.
That is why the Spanish Competition Authority is
taking advantage of our experience and our leverage as
a multi-sectorial institution.

We in fact have two

hats: we are the enforcement of competition policy
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authority, we are the antitrust authority, but we are
also the regulator in sectoral regulation and
monitoring of subsectors, notably the telecoms and
audiovisual sectors together with postal, transport,
and many others.

These two in particular are

extremely important when we are dealing with how to
regulate the digital market.
So we are using this multifaceted
perspective in order to contribute to the debate on
the optimal policy response to digital platforms for
the sake of consumer welfare.
MS. HESSE:

Thanks, Cani.

I assume both Koren and Sean are interested
in jumping into the fray.
MS. WONG-ERVIN:

Sure.

I am with Barry.

I

am not ready to give up on existing antitrust laws.
I do not think we have sufficient evidence
that there is a monopoly or concentration problem.
There are tons of studies on this rebutting it.

I

have written some and done things with Josh Wright and
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Judge Ginsburg.2
I was really happy to see AAG Delrahim and
Chairman Simons at the recent ICN conference push back
and warn about the dangers of rigid ex ante regulation
as opposed to the flexible case-by-case analysis of
antitrust.

They talked about the fact that you need

evidence, you need an identifiable market failure as a
necessary but not sufficient condition for regulation,
and then it needs to survive rigorous cost/benefit
analysis.
They also talked about the dangers of
regulatory capture.

I was happy to hear that.

I

think it is important to remember with this House
report that was mentioned that it is one party putting
it out, it was a staff report in fact, and it does not
reflect a widespread bipartisan view.

2

See Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Assessing Monopoly Power or Dominance in Platform Markets,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Jan. 29, 2020), available at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assessing-monopoly-power-or-dominance-inplatform-markets.; Joshua D. Wright, Koren Wong-Ervin, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bruce H.
Kobayashi, & James C. Cooper, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason
University School of Law, on the European Commission’s Public Consultation of the Regulatory
Environment for Platforms (Dec. 29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2709188.
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We have the antitrust agencies saying, “No,
we do not want ex ante regulation.”

Like Barry

mentioned, there is the paper by Commissioner Wilson
about the dangers of it.3
I will turn it over to Sean.
MS. HESSE:

Let me just jump in quickly on

that, Sean, because Koren raises a couple of good
points, one in particular that I want to weave into
the conversation: Is there a difference and should
there be a difference in terms of how, for example,
lawmakers think about these issues from a competition
policy perspective versus what is possible in the law
enforcement perspective in the United States, for
example, under the Clayton and Sherman Acts?

Is that

difference there — I think I would say there is — and
does that mean that Congress might have greater leeway
to act in this area if it sees a competition policy
question?

3

Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, The Growing Nostalgia for Past Regulatory Misadventures
and the Risk of Repeating These Mistakes with Big Tech, 8 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 10
(2020), available at https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/8/1/10/5614371.
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The other issue that I wanted to flag is a
little bit of a controversial statement.

Christine

cites the deregulation of the airline industry as a
success and I think there are a lot of consumers who
view the airline industry as one of the industries
that really does not function particularly well.
To weave that into Koren’s point, one of the
things that I thought a lot about when I was in the
agency is when a consumer experiences competition in a
market in a way that is different from how the
agencies evaluate it, is that something that the
agency should take note of and, not necessarily change
how they are doing things, but at least try to think
about why the agency enforcement agenda or how we are
enforcing the laws does not appear to match up with
how consumers experience competition in the
marketplace?
For me, the airline industry has always been
a place where that is the case.

You hear people

complaining constantly about airlines and complaining
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about what we did in the Obama Administration on the
American Airlines/US Airways case, which we believed
was perfectly consistent and correct from a
competition law perspective, but the consumer
experience seems to be different.
With that, I will pass it off to Sean.

He

can either jump on those topics or not, and then we
can have others talk about it.
MR. ROYALL:

Well, there is a lot there.

One of the things that I can say, picking up
on what Cani was describing in terms of what is going
on in Europe, is you talked about the difference in
competition policy and the traditional approach in the
United States of enforcing the antitrust laws.

I do

think that some of the things that are being discussed
in Europe are quite foreign to the way that we tend to
think.
She mentioned the New Competition Tool that
is being discussed as one of the potential gap-filling
mechanisms for dealing with Big Tech or Big Data.

As
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I understand it, what is being discussed is the idea
that when regulators perceive that a market may be
tipping — I think the term “tipping” is used — in the
direction of some platform achieving dominance, that
that alone might be something that would trigger
regulatory intervention, even if there has been no
abusive conduct, nothing that we would consider
exclusionary conduct, not even what Cani referred to
as the potential to expand their authority to
attempted dominance.
Even if there has not been any of that,
potentially this new tool would allow regulatory
intervention based on a perception that a market is
tipping and that there could be behavioral remedies or
other remedies that could be imposed to preserve the
ex ante status of competition.

I think that to

American ears sounds like a pretty radical notion.

Of

course I know these are just thoughts and this has not
been adopted yet.
I will say, though, that some of these
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things that struck me as I looked at what the
Europeans are discussing as potentially radical and
out of step with the way we traditionally have viewed
antitrust are coming close to home.
I know the panelists, including myself, have
not reviewed these lengthy documents in detail, but
just this week the House Antitrust Subcommittee issued
a report — and there are multiple reports; there is a
majority report and a minority report; I think there
may be a total of three reports — but some concepts
are being thrown out by this House subcommittee that
are very much akin to what the Europeans are
considering.

I know it is very far from that actually

happening in Europe maybe, but certainly here.

There

are some ideas that are being thrown out that look
very different from a competition policy standpoint
than the way that we normally approach antitrust
enforcement.
MS. HESSE:

Thanks.

Barry, Koren, or Cani, anything more on this
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topic, or should we move on?
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:

Yes, let me add something.

I understand that the approach in Europe is
different to that of the United States, but I would
like to bring here an example of a Regulation that was
imposed at the European level that in fact has worked
well in the area of telecoms.
We have the net neutrality principle.

That

was, as you know, an experience that we had in
electronic communications.

There was a Regulation at

the European level, and national regulation
authorities were supervising the existence and respect
of this net neutrality, which is very relevant in
areas such as Internet platforms.
As you know, this debate originated from the
fear that Internet service providers, by managing the
traffic carried their networks, could act as
gatekeepers for providers of content or applications.
This was the Open Internet Regulation at the European
level that was addressing these topics.

The
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Regulation was prohibiting technical blocking or
throttling of applications with some exceptions.
This Regulation was followed by Guidelines
that were adopted in 2016 and which are now under
review for updating. I would say that this open
Internet principle has worked so far relatively well
and that net neutrality has proved to be a
procompetitive element.
I understand that maybe the view on the
other side of the Atlantic is a different one, but it
is not the first time that a debate on how to regulate
situations in which you may have a gatekeeper has
happened in Europe.
I have to say that even if I was supporting
case-by-case analysis and the need to really analyze
first the market failures and the gaps before
introducing legislation, the truth is that we have
already have an experience that has worked out very
well in Europe.
MS. HESSE:

There has been a tremendous
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debate in the United States around net neutrality
also, so that is something that has arisen here.
Barry, do you want to jump in, or do you
want to move on?

Cani provided us with a perfect

segue to our next topic, which is gatekeepers, but I
are happy to have you jump in if you would like.
MR. NIGRO:

I would just like to reiterate

that I think there is a cost associated with
regulating ex ante.

It does create a risk of chilling

procompetitive behavior, and that sort of regulation
should only be used as a last resort where the
competition laws have sought to be enforced and failed
and there is actual concrete evidence of
anticompetitive effects.
I know you are going to talk about
gatekeepers, but I think an important part of that
conversation is what we mean when we say “gatekeeper?”
If I walk into a Kroger, Kroger is the gatekeeper to
everything in the store, but does that matter?
So I think it is important when you talk
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about gatekeepers to define it in a precise way, which
is one of the points I made at the very beginning of
our talk today.

Maybe it is another way of talking

about market definition, what is the relevant market,
and what role does the particular firm being focused
on have in the market?
But I will let you move on to the next
topic.
MS. HESSE:

Great.

We are running long.

I just want everybody

to know we are going to run over our allotted time.
We are supposed to end in a minute.

I do not want to

run over too much for personal reasons — my husband is
moderating the next panel and he will get mad at me if
I make him too late.

I am just kidding — he is

moderating it, but he is not going to get mad at me.
James said it is okay for us to keep going a
little bit, so we are going to keep going and the next
panel will join us.

I think we have ten more minutes,

so we will go to 11:30.
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I have seen no questions come through the
Q&A.

I encourage people, given that we are nearing

the end of our time, if you have questions to please
throw them into the Q&A, and we will try to answer
them.
With that, I will hand it off to Koren, who
is going to take us out on — I have been doing a lot
of Peloton, and they say, “So-and-so, take us out” —
our gatekeeper question — what does it mean to be a
gatekeeper, and should we be concerned about them;
and, if so, why?
MS. WONG-ERVIN:

I agree with Barry that it

is important to be clear about what you are talking
about.
The gatekeeper framework is based on the
model of a two-sided platform in which you have one
side (Group A, for let’s say Internet Operating System
(iOS) users that single-home) and another side (Group
B, let’s say application developers that multihome so
that they can reach all the users of the different
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platforms).

The idea is that

the only way for the

application developers to reach users of the iOS
platform is to join the platform.
According to the theory, the iOS platform
has a “monopoly” over access to those specific users
irrespective of its market share or how competitive
the market is for all users of the different operating
system platforms.

This theory has at least two built-

in assumptions.
The first, of course, is that the Group A
users single-home because, if they multihome, then
members of Group B can reach them outside the
platform.
The second assumption is that there are no
effective market mechanisms to constrain the
platform’s ability and incentive to set high prices or
restrictive policies to the multihoming side.

So the

idea is that consumers on Site A cannot switch if the
platform imposed a price increase or restricted
policies on Site B.
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But of course, this is contrary to our
fundamental economic understanding of platforms, which
is that there are interactions or interdependent
demand between the two sides that serve as a
competitive constraint on the platform vis-à-vis
members of Group B.
So, for example, in response to a price
increase the application developer could pass through
those higher prices to the users on the other side,
which, because of positive indirect network effects,
can reduce demand for those users.

And some

application developers may even leave the platform,
which again can affect demand on the other side.
To sum up, I think there are three issues.
The first is what Barry mentioned, a market
definition.

Are we really defining a market as just

the users of iOS platforms, even if they have a small
overall market share of all the platforms in the
market?

And then also there this idea that we are

ignoring the market mechanisms at play.
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The last thing I will say with regard to
multihoming is there is ample evidence of multihoming
in various markets, not just social media.4
MS. HESSE:

One question I wanted to add

that came to mind as Koren was talking is that there
is legal precedent for defining single-brand
submarkets.

I take the two-sided market point, but I

think in the US Airways/Sabre case the court of
appeals endorsed a single-brand submarket, and there
have been other cases where that has been the case.

I

would be interested to know how people think that
plays into this gatekeeper platform question.
MR. ROYALL:

Part of what I was going to

comment on here I think we have already discussed,
which is what is going on in Europe and the
regulations that are being considered, which I think
are in part in response to gatekeepers — we heard Cani

4

See, e.g., LAWRENCE WU & JOHN SCALF, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF
ADVERTISER MULTIHOMING (2012) (“Approximately 98 percent of the total ad spend managed
through DoubleClick Search is by advertisers that use both Google and Bing/Yahoo!”); HBS
DIGITAL INITIATIVE, How Did We Decide Where to Eat Before Yelp? (Mar. 5, 2018) available at
https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-digit/submission/how-did-we-decide-where-to-eat-before-yelp
(noting that multihoming costs are low for users where access to platforms are free, as is the case
with Yelp).
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say “gatekeeper” a number of times — so there are
gatekeeper concerns there.
In Europe, as I understand it, I do not know
how widely held, but there is a fairly popular view
that these dominant digital platforms are essential
facilities.

As I understand it — Cani can correct me

— I think there may be within the European regulatory
framework an ability to designate a business as an
essential facility, which has been done with railroads
and others, and I understand there may be some
proposals to formally designate certain dominant
digital platforms as essential facilities.
In the United States, this gatekeeper
concept or dominant platform concept is something
that, at least in terms of government antitrust
enforcement, I do not know that we have seen yet many
examples of that.
There is some current private litigation.
The Epic case relating to the Fortnite app against
Apple is an example where concepts like this are being
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thrown out.
Barry, you may want to talk about this.

I

know that you gave a speech, which I read in
preparation for this, that really got at this idea of
whether the essential facilities concept is
appropriate to apply here.

I think you made a

distinction between competing within the market and
competing for the market, and I thought made some good
points about potential adverse effects in terms of
disincentivizing investments and innovation if you
were to go too heavily after companies that do arrive
in an arguably dominant platform position.
MR. NIGRO:

That is right, I did talk about

those principles in the context of Big Data.
All of these things have a tradeoff in
forced sharing of a product or a service.

I think it

is obvious that if you tell somebody: “If you invest,
take a big risk, invest a lot of money and time trying
to come up with an innovation that you hope will be
highly valued, and you hit on something that is very
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successful and popular, guess what?

You will have to

share that with the rest of the world because you may
be deemed an essential facility.”
The cost of that type of rule is to dampen
the willingness to take on that risk, to make that
investment, and it is at the expense of long-term
innovation.

These rules may address short-term

concerns, but I think they are very detrimental to
long-term innovation.
Facilitating competition within the market
comes at the expense of competition for the market,
and there is a cost, just like with all regulation we
talked about earlier, associated with that sort of an
approach.

That is why I think ultimately going back

to tools that are flexible and can deal with the facts
on the ground, like antitrust law, should be the
starting point, and I continue to think it is not
appropriate to give up on antitrust just yet.
MS. HESSE:

We do not have any questions in

the queue and we are perilously close to 11:30.

56

I want to give each of you a chance to say a
few final words, if you would like, and I will then
close us out.
I think this has been a great discussion.
It has been interesting to hear all of the different
perspectives, and I hope those of you who are watching
and listening enjoyed it as well.
Let me go in reverse order.

Koren, anything

you want to jump in on?
MS. WONG-ERVIN:

On the House Judiciary

report and the other proposals, I want to caution
against going back to the pre-GTE/Sylvania days and
ignoring the robust body of empirical and other
economic research on verticals and mergers and the
like.

I hope that the U.S. antitrust agencies will

continue to be leaders in defending the existing
approach.
MS. HESSE:
MR. ROYALL:

Sean?
I do not want to say much.

enjoyed being on the panel.

I
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I do agree with Barry, though.

I have not

given up on traditional antitrust, and I believe that
the rigorous approach, including focusing, as we did
earlier when we were taking about lock-in and
causation and these other concepts, I think have
served us well, and I think they will continue to
serve us well.

I think we have plenty of tools to get

at these issues when there really are problems, even
without coming up with new regulation.
MS. HESSE:

Barry, any last comment?

MR. NIGRO:

I look forward to seeing what

happens over the next few months and few years.

I

think we are going to be in for interesting times when
it comes to antitrust.

I can only hope that we

continue to value competition and some of the
principles that have grown up around that and that
have, to be honest, worked pretty well for the most
part.
That does not mean that tweaks here and
there to some of our laws may not be appropriate, but
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I think overall the antitrust laws have done a good
job and with effective, aggressive enforcement and the
right cases can achieve a lot.
MS. HESSE:

And this time, last but not

least, Cani, who I feel has been a little bit
outnumbered in this discussion.
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:
outnumbered.

Oh, let’s continue to be

Some food for thought with the current

system of antitrust and merger control, which I very
much like, because I know it very well and I know to
apply it.
The truth is that we have not been able to
keep markets open, or at least not concentrated in
very high levels, and I wonder whether the current
system — and let us go for merger control, for example
— allowing for Facebook/WhatsApp, Facebook/Instagram,
Google/DoubleClick is sufficiently good if its purpose
to prevent high concentration in the market because,
as we all know, the more concentrated the market, the
less likely it is for competition.

Well — question
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mark — is there anything needed there?
MS. HESSE:

I for one am a big fan of

regulatory humility and of the enforcement agencies
everywhere in the world continuing to self-evaluate
and make sure that they are matching what they are
doing with both the law that we have but also with
consumer experiences.

It is important every once in a

while to step back and take a look.
I am going to be very interested to see what
happens over the next weeks and months and years as
antitrust continues to be at the center point for a
lot of issues that are coming up both in the United
States and abroad.
With that, I would like to thank everyone
for your contributions.

I would like to thank the

audience for staying with us, which hopefully they
did.

